[Security-meetings] Diwen Xue (UMich) to present his work tomorrow

[Xinan Zhou]

Hello everyone,

I'm happy to announce that on 5/6 1:00 pm (tomorrow), Diwen Xue from
University of Michigan will be presenting his research themed Measuring and
Mitigating Adversarial Intermediaries on the Global Internet at the
Cybersecurity Reading Group.

The meeting will be online at:
https://ucr.zoom.us/j/95161040878?pwd=i2jZaIGaVsmrohHZszNRBqJfzqM9a1.1

Diwen Xue
Diwen Xue is a fifth year PhD candidate at the University of Michigan,
working with Prof. Roya Ensafi. His research focuses on areas where the
privacy, security and availability implications of networked systems affect
users in the real world. He conducts Internet measurements at scale, uses
those observations to refine threat models, and builds countermeasures to
safeguard users’ communication on this increasingly adversarial Internet.
His works have received multiple distinctions, including the Distinguished
Paper Award from USENIX Security and the first prize of the Internet
Defense Prize.

Abstract
Over the past decade, significant shifts in the threat landscape have
positioned network infrastructure itself as a potential adversary. Rapid
advances and commoditization of networking technologies such as Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI), combined with loosened regulations like the repeal of net
neutrality, have granted the network with unprecedented capability and
freedom to inspect, modify, throttle, or even hijacks the traffic it
transports at fine granularity and line rate. What were once neutral “dumb
pipes” have evolved into capable and sometimes adversarial network
intermediaries—ranging from malicious middleboxes and rogue ISPs to
compromised routers and untrusted transit networks—all creating new threats
that increasingly erode user privacy, autonomy, and overall trust in
connectivity. In this talk, I will talk about how we tackle these
challenges empirically—conducting Internet measurements at scale, using
those observations to refine and update threat models, and building
countermeasures based on principled traffic obfuscation.


Thank you,
Xin'an Emmanuel Zhou
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